Research behind the mission
The American Dream did not become harder by accident.
Years of too little housing, rules that make modest homes harder to build, and more expensive financing have pushed ownership further from working Americans. Understanding those barriers helps us put capital where it can make a lasting difference.
This is a reading of outside research, not a claim that our program has already proved its impact. Sources checked September 30, 2026; each finding keeps its own observation period.
01 / Too few attainable homes
A shortage built over years cannot disappear at a closing.
Freddie Mac estimated a national housing shortage of 3.7 million homes in the third quarter of 2024. That estimate includes the homes needed for household formation and a functioning vacancy buffer. It is a model of unmet supply, not a count of vacant lots or a current 2026 inventory reading.
Freddie Mac, Housing Supply: Still Undersupplied, November 2024
What this means for our program. Purchase assistance can make a particular home attainable for a household. It does not create that home. We need to understand local availability, work with housing partners, and evaluate whether assistance reaches buyers or is absorbed into a higher sale price.
Supply estimates vary with assumptions about household formation and desirable vacancies. They should not be added to estimates of foregone sales or used as a count of eligible applicants.
02 / Rules shape what gets built
Government can make the starter home harder to build.
Minimum lot sizes, restrictions on density, parking requirements and lengthy approval processes can limit the homes a community allows. These are policy choices with real consequences for who can afford to live there.
A study comparing nearby properties across minimum-lot-size zoning boundaries found 11% lower housing density on the more restrictive side, alongside larger lots and homes. This is evidence of a specific rule changing the housing offered—not a finding that every regulation raises every home's price by the same amount.
Minimum-Lot-Size Regulation, NBER working paper 31710 · Federal Reserve housing affordability speech, September 2026
What this means for our program. We should favor opportunities where modest homes can actually be delivered, and be candid when local rules stand in the way. Families need more choices in the market alongside help reaching the choices that exist.
This evidence supports scrutiny of specific barriers. It does not assign the entire national affordability problem to one level of government or one policy.
03 / Building capacity takes time
The housing crash left a long recovery behind it.
Census research tracking construction workers displaced during the Great Recession found that, by 2013, more than 60% were working in another industry or had no observed employment. That historical loss helps explain why production could not simply restart where it left off.
Today, construction costs and the capacity to deliver homes still matter. The productivity story deserves precision: BLS reports gains in residential construction productivity over 2019–2025, even though single-family productivity fell in 2025. Claims that all building productivity has been flat for decades miss that variation.
Census, Where Did All the Construction Workers Go?, 2015 · BLS construction productivity, September 2026
What this means for our program. Partner capacity, realistic delivery schedules and sound properties matter as much as a financing structure. We should not promise future homes or lower building costs that we do not control.
The Census study is historical, and its employment records do not capture every kind of work. BLS measures selected construction industries, not the entire building sector.
04 / Financing became another barrier
Higher rates hurt buyers and keep some owners from selling.
When rates rise, the same loan requires a larger monthly payment. Existing owners with cheaper fixed-rate mortgages also have a reason to stay put. That reduces turnover, even when another household is ready to buy.
FHFA researchers estimated that this mortgage “lock-in” prevented 1.72 million sales from the second quarter of 2022 through the second quarter of 2024. It is an estimate of transactions that would otherwise have happened, not an estimate of homes missing from the national housing stock.
FHFA, The Geography of the Lock-In Effect, August 2024 · Freddie Mac mortgage rate survey
What this means for our program. Recoverable capital can reduce the first mortgage a buyer needs. That directly changes the scheduled first-mortgage payment. The assistance remains an obligation under its agreement, and the household must still be able to afford the full cost of owning.
05 / Getting in is only the beginning
An affordable closing must lead to an affordable life.
In the Federal Reserve's 2024 household survey, 68% of renters cited inability to afford a down payment as a reason they rented; 49% cited the monthly payment. Respondents could select several reasons. These are different barriers, and helping with one does not automatically solve the other.
Taxes, insurance, maintenance, utilities and any association fees belong in the household's budget. Emergency savings matter after the keys change hands. Our principal-and-interest examples deliberately isolate one part of that larger picture.
Federal Reserve, 2024 SHED, Table 40 · CFPB, budgeting for a home
What this means for our program. Evaluate actual household income, debts, savings and local ownership costs. Measure sustained ownership and financial resilience—not just the number of closings. The number of households our approach can responsibly serve is something to establish through the program.
Lessons for responsible assistance
Capital can open a door. Its design determines what follows.
Buyer assistance can affect prices and supply.
Research on England's Help to Buy found different effects in different markets. A 2024 study reported a substantial price effect in London. A September 2026 government evaluation found broader supply benefits but no strong evidence for that study's large London price effect; the size depended on statistical assumptions.
Our lesson: examine local supply, prices paid and who benefits. Neither study proves what a smaller American recoverable-assistance program will do.
Carozzi, Hilber & Yu, 2024 · Help to Buy evaluation, 2026, sections 1.4 and 7
Existing programs are useful comparisons, not proof of our outcomes.
Shared-equity programs, homebuyer counseling and down-payment assistance offer experience worth learning from. Their eligibility rules, repayment terms and markets differ. We should assess the complete terms and the quality of each evaluation before borrowing its conclusions.
Urban Institute, shared-equity evaluation · HUD, homebuyer counseling followup
Observations describe what was measured. Causal estimates depend on study design. Our program implications are judgments informed by those findings, and our own outcomes remain to be measured.